

“The Ninth (9th) U.S. Infantry Regiment (MANCHUS)’s Two Days of Hell during the 18-19 July 1918 Battle of Soissons”

The following narration highlights the *9th U.S. Infantry Regiment (9th) /2nd U.S. Infantry Division (2ID)*’s actions during the 18-19 July 1918 Battle of Soissons in France.

At 0435 hours on Thursday 18 July 1918, a combined American Expeditionary Force (AEF) and French Army division mounted attacks on German positions below the town of Soissons, France. The attacks were executed per the direction of French Army Letter Order Number 1439 in File 402-30.1 dated June 14, 1918.¹ The actual operational details were issued in French Army Instructions Number 18, 392, Number 405/OW, and Number 464/S, 10,452. These orders were then modified by French Order Letter No. 33,873, file 403-30.1 dated June 27, 1918.² The *French Tenth Army* issued Order No. 227 dated July 16, 1918 as the final directive for the operation.³

The tactical objective of the offensive, designated as “Aise-Marne Offensive,” was to rupture German lines threatening Paris, and to destroy the German lines of communications and supplies running into Soissons from the German supply centers, and then down to the German forces in a bulge of the French lines. (See Map a) The strategic objectives were to disrupt an anticipated German offensive, and to take the initiative in the war.⁴

The background of the operation is that the joint Allied Forces commander, French Marshall Ferdinand Foch, wanted an ambitious offensive strategy to break the German positions to relieve the pressure on Paris. His next goal of the operation was take the offensive against the German Imperial Army.⁵

The reasons for the Allied offensive were the Germans had pushed a huge bulge into British lines at Picardy on March 21st (“Operation Michael”), and then followed up with attacks against the French with their three(3) spring offensives; at Berry-au-Bac on May 27th (“Operation Blucher”), then at Compiègne on June 9th (“Operation Gneisenau”), and finally on July 15 against the French near Rheims (“Operation Rheims”).^{6 7} (See Map b)

These attacks pushed the British and French lines back many miles, killed or captured thousands of British and French soldiers, and threatened to cut the French highways and railroads leading to Paris as well as splitting the British forces from the French.^{8 9} The Germans were planning a major attack after their 15 July offensive to break the British at Flanders.¹⁰ See Map c which reflects the French lines stretching from Montdidier in the west to Rheims in the east.

The AEF forces were two(2) regular army divisions, the *2nd U.S. Infantry Division (2ID)*, [“2nd to None”], and the *1st U.S. Infantry Division (1ID)* [“The Big Red 1”]. The two(2) divisions had been recently assigned to the *US Army’s I Corps*.¹¹ The French Army assigned the *1st Moroccan Division* to the operation. See Table of Organizations one, two, and three (Table 1) for the *2ID*, *1ID*, and French divisions’ respective components. See Table 2 for the “Doughboys.”

The *2ID* was officially organized in France on 22 September 1917 while the *1ID* had been officially organized in the United States on 24 May 1917.^{12 13} The *2ID* left Hoboken, NJ in September 1917 on board several troop transport ships. The *2ID*, including the *9th*, arrived in France and England in

late September.¹⁴ (See Table 3 for the history of the *9th Regiment*.) The *2ID*'s United States Marine Corps *4th Brigade's 5th Regiment* had already sailed to France on 14 June 1917 while the *6th Marine Regiment* sailed later on September 23rd.^{15 16} The *1ID* was the first American division sent to France in June 1917.¹⁷

Both AEF divisions were bloodied veterans of recent trench warfare and offensive actions. The *9th/2ID* had completed three months of trench warfare and defensive operations at Chateau-Thierry, and the offensive operations at Belleau Woods, and Vaux in June.^{18 19} The *1ID* had conducted the successful capture of Cantigny on 28-29 May, and were on the trench-lines before and after their successful operation at Cantigny.²⁰

After Belleau Woods and Vaux, the *9th/2ID* had been relieved on the line by the National Guard *26th Infantry Division* and took trucks to their rest area at the army line of La Barre-Bezu-Chambardin les Bruilis where the *1st* and *3rd Battalions* settled in at Dhuisy Woods, the *2nd Battalion* billeted in Chaton, and the headquarters and supply companies billeted at Cocherel.^{21 22}

The *9th/2ID* were recovering their strength and troop levels after the bloody Belleau Wood and Vaux offensives where they suffered 740 casualties: 4 officers killed, 14 wounded, and 85 enlisted killed, 631 wounded, and 6 missing.²³

In early July 1918, both divisions were in rest areas after their recent bloody actions. This situation soon changed because General John J. Pershing had agreed to loan these divisions to the French army to be part of the Soissons operation. The two divisions were transferred to the French Army's *XX Corp*, commanded by General Berdoulat, in their *Tenth Army* in accordance with French Army Telegram Number 1506/File 409-30.1 dated July 14, 1918.²⁴

The French Moroccan Division had been active since the beginning of the war as an assault division. The French division included the French Foreign Legion's *1st RMLE Regiment* as well as some African Senegalese battalions.²⁵

In addition to this complicated reality, the *2ID* had just had a change of command with Major General Omar Bundy leaving and Major General James G. Harbord taking command. BG Hanson E. Ely was the *3rd Brigade's* brigade commander, and Marine Corps Colonel Wendell C. Neville was the *4th Brigade's* commander.^{26 27}

Per French Army instruction 18,932, file 403-30.1 dated June 16, 1918, Foch directed French General Henri Philippe Petain to formulate a broad front objective with Soissons as the main offensive. Petain ordered French General Charles Mangin of the *Tenth Army* to direct the offensive. Foch's plan, issued by General Petain - Order Number 9,732, "*Instructions*", dated July 8, 1918, also included simultaneous attacks along the bulge with other American and French divisions assigned to the French Army's *6th Army* commanded by General Degoutte, and the French Army's *5th Army* commanded by General Berthelot.^{28 29}

The French assigned the *501st Tank Regiment* to the assault: the regiment was equipped with the 25-ton "ST-Chamond" tanks mounting a 75-mm cannon, the 13.6-ton "Schneider CA-1" also armed with a 75mm cannon, and "6.7 tons French Renault FT" tanks equipped with either a 37mm cannon or a 7.92mm Hotchkiss machine gun.^{30 31 32} In all, there were a total of 478 tanks assigned to the *Tenth Army*

for the Soissons operation, and to the *Sixth Army* for the support operation launched from Chateau-Thierry.³³

On 16 July, the Americans received their vague orders for the Soissons offensive. The French operations order necessitated the division to board truck convoys driven by Vietnamese drivers and make a forced overnight drive from Chateau-Thierry to the assembly area at the Bois-de-Retz Forest on 17 July. The troops left their Choceresel rest area adjacent to Chateau-Thierry without hot meals, only field rations and not total ammunition loads.³⁴ They were also lacking maps of the planned terrain of the offensive and no guides familiar with the geography. The *3rd Brigade's 23rd Infantry Regiment* left for the battle in worse shape: they had to leave behind most of their platoon, crew-served heavy weapons: the 8mm MLE14 Hotchkiss heavy machine gun, 8mm Chauchat squad machine guns (considered the worst weapon of the war), 37mm trench cannons, and the Stokes trench mortars.

Once they arrived at the Retz forest late in the afternoon, their situation got complicated by a heavy downpour and crowded, muddy roads jammed with their forces.³⁵ After assembling in the rainy, dark woods, the *2ID* regiments were still not on the kick-off line and had to double-time several miles to their respective start-line locations overnight into the next morning on the 18th. This was to have a negative effect later in the day as the troops ran out of energy and strength.

The *9th/2ID* were on the right side of the coalition attack with the French division in the middle, and the *1ID* on the left. The *9th/2ID's* line of departure was from a re-entrant in the northeastern corner of the Villers-Cotterets Forest pointing 30 degrees north of east. The first day's objective line was the town of Vierzy. The second objective was the town of Vauxcastle.³⁶ See maps.

On their right, the *23rd/2ID's* first day's objective was the Beaufort farm. There was a French division, *the 38th Division*, on the *23rd's* right flank which was not part of the Soissons attack.³⁷

The *Marine Corp's 5th Regiment* was on the *9th's* left. The *5th's* first day's objective was the le Translon Farm. The *5th Marine* battalions' objective was going to be difficult to achieve because the battalions were below authorized strength levels after Belleau Wood, and they had to cover a large expanse of geography with just the three battalions.

On the Marines' left, was the *1st Moroccan Division*. The Moroccan's first line of objectives for 18 July ran from the Dommiers Ravine through the Bois de Quesnoy to the Glaux farm. Their next objective would be the town of Chaudun.

The *1ID* was on the Moroccan division's left. The French *153rd Division* was on the *1ID's* left but was not part of the Soissons operation.³⁸

The *Marine Corps 6th Regiment* and their *6th Marine Machine Gun Battalion* were designated the *2ID's* reserve unit. The field orders were overly complicated and soon fell apart under the harsh and bloody reality of combat.

The official *2ID* history, The Second Division American Expeditionary Force in France 1917-1919, has the best narration of the impending complicated mess that became once the fighting started: "*From the point of view of the 2d Division, the situation proved to be complicated. The general axis of attacks was a little south to east. The front lines ran nearly north and south along the eastern border of the Forest de Retz; but at the boundary line of the 2nd and the Moroccan*

Divisions two or three square miles of the northeastern tip of the forest was still held by the Germans, causing a reentrant bend in the line of the XX Corps, and the part of it that fell to the 2d Division faced nearly north. This bit of wood was a strong position, and it was proposed that it be flanked out by the advance, rather than attacked frontally; but it was necessary for both the 2d and Moroccan Divisions to send troops through it to clean up and to maintain connections.

This called for an awkward maneuver. The 2d Division had to execute a great right wheel on a front of two miles. This would bring the left out of the woods, the whole line facing northeast, the front reduced to a mile and a half. Following this direction for about a mile, the front still narrowing, it would reach the first intermediate objective, the line of Beaufort Farm. Here it must wheel again to the right, and advance south of east on a front of slightly over a mile. Another mile's advance would bring it to the next objective, a transverse ravine, where its right would strike the village of Vauxcastille; still another mile, and its right would come to the Village of Vierzy, the final objective in orders issued on the morning of July 17th.³⁹

The 2ID's battle front was an open plateau running six miles wide. The terrain was marked by open wheat fields, deep ravines, ridgelines, tree-lines, and caves which had been fortified by the Germans with machine gun nests, mortar batteries, and trench lines and bunkers.

In order to maintain operational secrecy for the assault, the American divisions had to remain in the forest before "H" hour. Their divisional artillery didn't leave for the kickoff line until the 17th and arrived at their firing positions just on time for "H" hour. Furthermore, the traditional pre-operation French artillery operations against German rear positions and massed fire against front-line positions were not carried out per GEN Mangin orders. (French Army telegram Number 1803/File 409-30.1 dated July 16, 1918)⁴⁰. The French artillery batteries were kept several miles behind the front lines as an additional move to maintain the secrecy of the attack. In addition, Mangin had prohibited any reconnaissance missions in the vicinity. The French further confused the Americans by issuing very vague, incomplete orders just before the start of the operation.

The *Tenth Army's* operational area was marked by the line from Dommiers-Chaudun-Villemontoire running south of east angling to the south of Soissons.

Each division had specific geographic objectives in the direction of Soissons. The 2ID's objectives for 18 July were to seize Vierzy, and then the Vauxcastille Ravine. The 1ID's objectives for 18 July were the Missy ravine, and then the Chazelle Ravine.

The Moroccan division's objectives for 18 July were to clear the Dommiers Ravine and then to clear out the Bois de Quesnoy.

The German positions were defended by a mix of veteran divisions including the 1st *Bavarian Division*, the 14th, 47th, and 220th *Reserve Infantry Divisions* of the German's *Ninth Army-XIII Corps*.⁴¹ Other German units included the 218th and 219th *Reserve Infantry Divisions*.⁴² In addition to the machine gun nests and bunkers, the Germans had turned a number of villages and farm houses into fortified strongpoints.

While assembling the regiment in the forest, the 9^{th's} regimental commander, Colonel Leroy Upton, called his officers together and directed that CAPT Charles E. Speers' 1st *Battalion* to be the lead

assault unit followed by MAJ Arthur E Bouton's 2nd *Battalion* as the reserve battalion, and CAPT Henry H Worthington's 3rd *Battalion* as the support unit. Colonel Upton also threw in a "pre-game pep talk."⁴³

At "H" hour, the 2ID's 2nd *Field Artillery Brigade's* 12th, 15th, and 17th *Field Artillery* regiments, began their rolling barrage on the German positions. The 9th, 23rd, and 5th *Marine Regiments* "went over the top" and stormed across the wheat fields towards the German positions. The French's FT-17 Renault tanks also started across the wheat fields.

Their determined charge carried them through the German lines and into the open fields towards their second objective. The Germans had been shocked by the sudden artillery barrage, and the fierce charge, and were either killed or surrendered.⁴⁴ The 2ID's 2nd *Field Artillery Brigade* moved forward right behind the infantry with the regiments providing artillery support. The 12th *Regiment* supported the Marines, and the 15th supported the 3rd *Brigade*.⁴⁵

But the German forces on the 9th's left flank were putting out very heavy machine gun fire into their ranks because the Marines had been late to the jump-off point. Another complication was that the Marines drifted away from their assigned direction line of advance order for their objective areas because of few maps and enemy fire. In response, the 9th's troops shifted their direction line of attack to meet and eliminate the Germans who were supported by snipers, long-range machine guns, artillery and mortar fire, and gas attacks. The 9th's 1st *Battalion* shifted its attack against the fortified Verte Feuille Farm. Some of the 5th *Marines* soon joined in the attack and the combined forces overran the German position.

Furthermore, the Americans and French had to endure the Imperial German Air Force (Deutsche Luftstreitkräfte) attacks by "*Albatros C.X S*," "*Halberstadt C.V*," and "*Hannover CL.IIIa*" ground-attack bombers.^{46 47} [The German's WW2 "*JU-87 Stuka*" is an equivalent ground-attack platform as is the USAF's current A-10 "*Warthog*."]

There are numerous mentions of the German air attacks in the various memoirs and official records. Private First Class Carl A. Brannen of the Marine Corps 6th *Regiment's* 80th *Company* wrote in his diary: "*enemy planes flew low overhead.*"⁴⁸ 1LT Oscar L. Chenoweth of "*M*" *Company* had the following passage about the German aircraft attacks in his Operations Report dated 11 August 1918: "*...also airplanes were pouring machine gun fire upon us from above. They were flying so close that our rifle fire was more or less effective upon them and it is reported that one was brought down in this manner.*"⁴⁹

There is no mention of Allied, especially the American's 1st *Pursuit Group*, air units providing support for the AEF forces. Petain and Mangin had assigned Order 416-30.1 "*Mission of Air Division*," dated July 17, 1918, for reconnaissance missions to their Air Division but alas, no air support for the Soissons operation.⁵⁰ The American air effort was assigned, GHQ AEF Folder 297 "Letter" dated June 25, 1918, to the 1st *Pursuit* to provide support for the Chateau-Thierry operation.⁵¹ [There are no index entries for "Soissons" or "Aisne-Marne Offensive" in Bert Frandsen's Hat in the Ring: The Birth of American Air Power in the Great War.] The French Air Force was flying reconnaissance missions in other sectors.

The troops also had to endure the July heat and dust, and no fresh water supplies. This bad situation wore out the troops' endurance and strength after their early morning run to the front.

An additional burden on the Americans, was that the French were continually lagging behind the assault's time line which allowed the Germans to fire on their flanks along with the frontal defensive fire facing the American charge. The French division's slow advance threw off the planned timeline of the operation which caused the gaps between the French and the 5th Regiment as well as gaps with the 1ID.

To further complicate the operations, communications between the French and Americans, and between the American commanders and their troops were poor because of bad technology at the time; the primitive field telephones, and the language differences. Commanders relied on runners, and motorcycle couriers to stay in contact with their respective headquarters and troops on the battlefield. The 2ID's headquarters were located at Chamigny and then at Beaurepaire Farm. General Harbord did not play a decisive command leadership role of the 2ID during the battle in the evaluation of the authors of Soissons 1918 on page 156: "*Harbord never really commanded his division. He joined it in transit and watched it do what it could with the minimum of input from him or his staff.*" Marine Corps historian-author/WW2 veteran George B. Clark has a similar negative assessment of Harbord: "*...the latter had little chance to actively command the division.*"⁵²

The 3rd Brigade was ordered to launch another attack in the late afternoon on the 18th to seize Verzy but the attack was delayed because of poor communications leading to a lack of coordination with the 23rd Regiment, the Marines, and the French tanks.^{53 54}

Throughout the day, American forces, 2ID -3rd and 4th Brigade, and 1ID, intermingled with each other's units as well as the French units, and crossed divisional responsibility boundary lines. At one point, an US Army 1st LT Eliot D. Cooke on detached assignment with the Marine's 5th Regiment 2nd Battalion's "55th Company," mounted an attack on Chandun along with some of the 9th's 1st Battalion strays as well as some 1ID/18th Regiment strays, and some French 1st Division Senegalese.^{55 56}

Beginning late afternoon of the 18th and into the 19th, the Germans rushed divisions into the area to hold the line and to attempt counter-attacks: 28th Division, 46th Division, 94th Brigade, 220th Reserve Infantry, 159th Reserve Infantry, and 53rd Reserve Infantry.⁵⁷ [See Appendix 1 "German Order of Battle" in Soissons 1918, pages 159-160 for the complete list of German units engaged.]

During both days, the French tanks greatly assisted with the assaults by destroying fixed positions and machine gun nests but most were put out of action by mechanical failure, the terrain, and German artillery. German artillery was the "best tank killer." There are numerous photographs of the blown-up tanks taken during and after the battle. (See National Archive's US Army Signal Corps photographic library files: i.e. "III-SC-16559" and "117-TPB-7-2-27" "*The 2d Division's attack sector, looking east from a point just north of Beaurepaire Farm.*")

The following "highlights" (the 2ID History's narration covers 12 pages) of the first and second days of combat include:

1. Seized Beaurepaire Farm, and the Marines seized the village of Chaudun
2. Reached Vierzy by 0930 hours
3. A mixed group of all the battalions mainly the 1st seized the Maison-Neve Farm.
4. CAPT Worthington's 3rd Battalion over ran the east bank of the Vauxcastille-Maison-Neuve Ravine.

5. Defeated a German counterattack at the road leading to the left of Vierzy and an adjacent ravine
6. *2nd* and *3rd* *Battalions* launched an attack against a road which crossed Hill 132.
7. At 7:30 PM on the 18th, the *2nd* and *3rd* *Battalions* launched an assault against the road crossing Hill 132.
8. Defeated a German counterattack against the battalions dug in alongside the road on the morning of 19 July.
9. Regiment stood down the evening of 19 July, and was fed a hot meal
10. The French *58th Division* relieved the *2ID*.
11. On the 19th -20th, the *9th*, *23rd*, and Marine regiments marched to a rest area.⁵⁸

The 9th's "M" Company actions during its assault included destroying German machine gun nests while enduring artillery fire, machine gun fire, snipers, and German bombers after pushing forward 7 kilometers. Later that evening, *"M" Company* launched another attack gaining another 3 kilometers. The next morning, it repulsed a German counter-attack.⁵⁹

The 9th's "L Company" charged across the wheat fields under severe machine gun fire and reached Vierzy that morning. The next day *L Company* was part of a counter-attack against entrenched Germans in the ravine adjacent to Beaurepaire. These actions came at a heavy price. CAPT Worthington was killed in action.⁶⁰

CAPT Speer led his *1st Battalion* across the wheatfields at 0435. Later that morning, he and his troops captured a German artillery battery in a ravine. On the 18th, at 6:30 PM, COL Upton and CAPT Speer led an assortment of companies from both the *1st* and *3rd Battalions* and the *5th Marines* an assault on a hill adjacent to Vierzy. CAPT Speer was wounded in the ankle and had to turnover command of the battalion to Captain Foley.⁶¹

MAJ Bouton was killed in action while leading his men against machine gun nests while under heavy artillery fire which earned him a posthumous Distinguished Service Cross.^{62 63} Many of the respective battalions lost their senior commanders resulting in company and platoon officers taking over the battalions, and non-commissioned officers taking command of companies.⁶⁴ The *9th's* regimental commander, COL Leroy S. Upton, was "hands-on" and "up front" during the battle between issuing orders before the battle, visiting the battalions during the engagement, and at one point, leading a charge himself.⁶⁵

Because of stiffened German resistance, and *the 2ID's* heavy losses from the 18th and then the 19th, General Harbord ordered his reserve unit the *6th Marine Regiment* into the battle on the 19th. The *6th Regiment's* battalions, *2/6* commanded by Major Thomas Holcomb, the *1/6* commanded by Major John A. Hughes, and the reserve unit the *3/6* commanded by Major Berton Sibley, left their kickoff point at Beaurepaire Ferme at 0630 hours and started towards their objective at the Chateau-Thierry – Soissons Highway.⁶⁶ They immediately ran into heavy artillery fire and machine gun fire. Because of the enemy fire, the *6th Regiment* suffered 1,300 officers and men and were unable to advance any further stopping short of their objective.⁶⁷

Spaulding and Wright's The 2ID in France has five pages of complex narration of the utter Chinese fire-drill chaos of the second day of battle on the 19th with shot-up companies, battalions,

platoons, regiments all inter-mixed together fighting on multiple fronts against a variety of German positions with little ammunition or water and no strength or energy left.

By the end of 19 July, the battered 9th troops had exhausted themselves and their ammunition, water, food, and energy in the face of the stiffened German defenses. It suffered 19 officers killed, 33 wounded, and 1 missing (53), and 182 men killed, 1065 wounded, and 58 missing casualties (1305) with a total of 1,358 casualties in the regiment. But it met its original goal by pushing 11 kilometers into and past the German lines.⁶⁸ The 2ID did not, however, reach its final objective of Tigny.⁶⁹ It captured 2,700 Germans, 12 cannons, and hundreds of machine guns.⁷⁰

The 23rd and the 4th Marine Brigade's regiments also suffered heavy casualties. The Marine Brigade suffered 1,832 casualties (200 killed and 1,632 wounded) over the two days.⁷¹

The 2ID overall lost 29 officers and 452 men killed, and 154 officers and 3,788 men wounded casualties.⁷² The 9th/2ID's successful operations captured 66 officers and 2,810 men as well as 76 artillery pieces and 23 mortars and minenwerfers.⁷³ The Germans suffered 168,000 casualties of whom 56,700 died.⁷⁴ The various German divisions were completely disrupted.

The French awarded the 9th the *Fourragere with gold star* with the colors of the *Croix de guerre*.⁷⁵ A French observer said of the Americans: "Everyone says the same: they're first rate troops, fighting with intense individual passion (concentrated on the enemy) and wonderful courage."⁷⁶

Numerous 9th officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted were awarded combat valor awards. See Table y.

Major General Harbord was transferred to be the commander of the Services of Supply. He was replaced by Marine Corps Major John A. Lejeune. Colonel Upton was promoted and took command of the 57th Brigade, 29th Division. Colonel George W. Stuart replaced him.⁷⁷

The 9th/2ID was relieved on the line by the French 58th Infantry Division on the 20th, and marched/was trucked to Nanteuil-le-Haudouin which is northeast of Paris as a rest area. The 9th/2ID remained at Nanteuil-le-Haudouin in the Marbache area while it recovered its strength, received replacements, and had quiet duty.⁷⁸ Soon, however, the 9th/2ID was ordered back to the trench lines. It then participated in the 12 September 1918 ST Michel operation.⁷⁹

The 1ID continued its assaults into 22 July while suffering significant casualties, 7,317, but pushed 7 miles into the German lines, and captured Berzy. The 1ID captured 3,400 Germans and 75 guns. The 1ID was then relieved by the Scottish 15th Division.⁸⁰ ⁸¹The Moroccan Division also continued the fight into 20 July and then relieved by the French 87th Division.⁸²

The overall Soissons operation was a success because it battered the German forces and forced them into a fighting withdrawal from the "bulge" area to a defensive line running from Reims to Soissons along the Vesle River.⁸³ ⁸⁴ Plus, the German forces sent to try to stop the offensive had been the planned July offensive's manpower. The Germans weren't able to mount another offensive action after Soissons: the tide was turned and the war's "turning point."

"Keep up the Fire!"

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- ¹ United States Army in the World War 1917-1919, Volume 5, Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Force – Champagne-Marne and Aisne-Marne, Historical Division- Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1948, page 223.
- ² United States Army in the World War 1917-1919, Volume 5, pages 224-230.
- ³ United States Army in the World War 1917-1919, Volume 5, pages 290.
- See also Soissons 1918, Colonel Rolfe L Hillman, Jr & LTC Douglas V Johnson/PHD, Texas A&M University Press, 1999, page 12.
- ⁴ United States Army in the World War 1917-1919, Volume 5, page 218.
- ⁵ Paul Greenwood, The Second Battle of the Marne 1918, Airlife Publishing, UK, 1998, pages 45-48. //See also Coffman, The War to End all Wars, University Press of Kentucky, 1998, , pages 233-235.
- ⁶ American Armies and Battlefields in Europe, American Battle Monuments Commission, Government Printing Office, 1938(reprinted 1992 by US Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC), pages 29-37.
- ⁷ Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Woods 1918, David Bonk, Osprey Publishing Campaign #177, Oxford, UK, 2007, pages 8-11.
- ⁸ Argonne 1918: The AEF in France, Barry Gregory, Ballantine Illustrated History of the Violent Century, New York, 1972, pages 59-65.
- ⁹ Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Woods 1918, David Bonk, Osprey Publishing Campaign #177, Oxford, UK, 2007, pages 8-11.
- ¹⁰ The War to End all Wars, Edward M. Coffman. University Press of Kentucky, 1998 edition, page 222.
- ¹¹ United States Army in the World War 1917-1919, Volume 5, page 230.
- ¹² Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War: American Expeditionary Forces++ Divisions, United States Army Historical Section /Army War College, 1931, GPO, Washington, DC, page 25.
- ¹³ Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War: American Expeditionary Forces++ Divisions, page 5.
- ¹⁴ The Ninth Infantry in the World War, page 12, and National Archives Record Group 120, Box 36, File 202-10.7 “Station Report.”
- ¹⁵ The Devil Dogs; Fighting Marines of World War I George B. Clark, Presidio Press, 1999. page 3.
- ¹⁶ Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War: American Expeditionary Forces++ Divisions, page 25.
- ¹⁷ Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War: page 5.
- ¹⁸ The Ninth Infantry in the World War, 1919, Koblenz, pages 6-12.
- ¹⁹ National Archives Record Group 120, Box 37, “*A History of the Ninth Infantry.*”
- ²⁰ Matthew J. Davenport, First Over There: The Attack on Cantigny America’s First Battle of World War I, ST Martin’s Press/New York, 2015.
- ²¹ The Ninth Infantry in the World War, ,1919, Koblenz, Germany, page 12.
- ²² Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War: American Expeditionary Forces++ Divisions, pages 33 and 121.
- ²³ The Ninth Infantry in the World War, page 12.
- ²⁴ United States Army in the World War 1917-1919, Volume 5, page 240.
- ²⁵ Soissons 1918, Colonel Rolfe L Hillman, Jr & LTC Douglas V Johnson, page 53.
- ²⁶ Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War: American Expeditionary Forces++ Divisions, page 21.
- ²⁷ Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, page 21.
- ²⁸ United States Army in the World War 1917-1919, Volume 5, page 224.
- ²⁹ United States Army in the World War 1917-1919, Volume 5, page 245.
- ³⁰ United States Army in the World War 1917-1919, Volume 5, page 234.
- ³¹ French Tanks of World War I, Steven J. Zaloga, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2010.
- ³² Website: “*Tank Encyclopedia*” http://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww1/fr/french_ww1_tanks.php
- ³³ Soissons 1918, Colonel Rolfe L Hillman, Jr & LTC Douglas V Johnson/PHD, Texas A&M University Press, 1999, page 39.
- ³⁴ The Ninth Infantry in the World War, pages 12 -. See also The Second Division in France.

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- ³⁵ National Archives Record Group 120, Box 39, File 202-33.6, "*Operations July 18, 1918*" dated July 18, 1918.
- ³⁶ The Ninth Infantry in the World War, page 14.
- ³⁷ Map, page 231, United States Army in the World War 1917-1919, Volume 5.
- ³⁸ Map, page 231, United States Army in the World War 1917-1919, Volume 5.
- ³⁹ The Second Division American Expeditionary Force in France 1917-1919, Colonel Oliver Lyman Spaulding (FA), and Colonel John Womack Wright(INF), Reprint by Battery Press, Nashville, TENN, 1989, page 110.
- ⁴⁰ United States Army in the World War 1917-1919, Volume 5, page 245.
- ⁴¹ The Second Division American Expeditionary Force in France 1917-1919, Spaulding and Wright, page 115.
- ⁴² IBID, page 116.
- ⁴³ National Archives Record Group 120, Box 39, File 202-33.6, "*Operations July 18, 1918*" dated July 18, 1918.
- ⁴⁴ George B. Clark, The Second Infantry Division in World War 1, McFarland Press, Jefferson North Carolina, 2007, pages 108 and 109.
- ⁴⁵ Spaulding and Wright, The Second Division American Expeditionary Force in France, 1917-1919, page 119.
- ⁴⁶ Germany's First Air Force 1914-1918, Peter Kilduff, Arms and Armour Press, London, UK, 1991.
- See also "*Aerodrome The Aircraft of World War One*" website: <http://www.theaerodrome.com/aircraft/index.php>, accessed 22 February 2018..
- ⁴⁷ Wikipedia Website: "Luftstreitkräfte": <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luftstreitkr%C3%A4fte>, accessed 22 February 2018.
- ⁴⁸ Carl A. Brannen, Over There, Texas A&M University Press, 1996, page 32.
- ⁴⁹ National Archives Record Group 120, Box 39, File 202-33.6, "*Operations July 18, 1918*," dated August 11, 1918.
- ⁵⁰ United States Army in the World War 1917-1919, Volume 5, page 247.
- ⁵¹ United States Army in the World War 1917-1919, Volume 5, page 228.
- ⁵² Clark, The Second Infantry Division in World War 1, page 96.
- ⁵³ Clark, The Second Infantry Division in World War 1, page 105-106.
- ⁵⁴ Clark, The Devil Dogs, pages 238-240.
- ⁵⁵ Clark, The Second Infantry Division in World War 1, page 101.
- ⁵⁶ Clark, The Devil Dogs, pages 238-240.
- ⁵⁷ Spaulding and Wright, The Second Division American Expeditionary Force in France 1917-1919, page 123.
- ⁵⁸ The Ninth Infantry in the World War, pages 15-17.
- ⁵⁹ National Archives Record Group 120, Box 39, File 202-33.6, "*History of our part in the Soissons Rheims Offensive*," dated August 11, 1918.
- ⁶⁰ National Archives Record Group 120, Box 36, File 202-11.4 "*9th "L" Company History*".
- ⁶¹ National Archives Record Group 120, Box 39, File 202-33.6 "*Operations July 18, 1918*," dated July 18, 1918.
- ⁶² National Archives Record Group 120, Box 36, File 202-11.4 "*9th "L" Company History*".
- ⁶³ Spaulding and Wright, The Second Division American Expeditionary Force in France 1917-1919, page 306.
- ⁶⁴ National Archives Record Group 120, Box 37, "*A History of the Ninth Infantry.*"
- ⁶⁵ National Archives Record Group 120, Box 36, File 202-33.6 "*Operations July 18, 1918*," dated July 18, 1918."
- ⁶⁶ Clark, The Devil Dogs, pages 246-252.
- ⁶⁷ Clark, The Second Infantry Division in World War 1, op cit 109.
- ⁶⁸ The Ninth Infantry in the World War, pages 16-17.
- ⁶⁹ Hillman & Johnson, Soissons 1918, , pages 112-114.
- ⁷⁰ The Ninth Infantry in the World War, page 17.
- ⁷¹ Clark, The Devil Dogs, page 434, Appendix C.
- ⁷² Spaulding and Wright, The Second Division American Expeditionary Force in France 1917-1919, page 132.
- ⁷³ National Archives Record Group 120, Box 36, File 202-11.6 "*Prisoners.*" Dated 14 Sept 1918.
- ⁷⁴ Website: "*Battle of Soissons*" [http://military.wikia.com/wiki/Battle_of_Soissons_\(1918\)](http://military.wikia.com/wiki/Battle_of_Soissons_(1918)), accessed 3 March 2018.
- ⁷⁵ National Archives Record Group 120, Box 36, File 202-11.4 "*Citations*".
- ⁷⁶ Coffman, The War to End all Wars, page 246.
- ⁷⁷ Clark, The Second Infantry Division in World War 1, page 113.
- ⁷⁸ The Ninth Infantry in the World War, pages 16-17.
- ⁷⁹ The Ninth Infantry in the World War, pages 18-20.

⁸⁰ Edward M. Coffman, The War to End all Wars, page 245.

⁸¹ BG(Ret) S.L.A. Marshall, The American Heritage History of World War I, American Heritage Press, New York, 1982, page 290.

⁸² Soissons 1918, Hillman & Johnson, page 126.

⁸³ Greenwood, The Second Battle of the Marne 1918, page 150.

⁸⁴ Soissons 1918, Hillman & Johnson, pages 128-136.